Opinion | The Taiwan-Somaliland Pact: A New Geopolitical Flashpoint in the Horn of Africa

By: Abdiqadir Jama Fartaag

Introduction: A Landmark Agreement 

On July 24, 2025, The Republic of Somaliland and the Republic of China (Taiwan) signed a landmark Coast Guard Cooperation Agreement, a move that created immediate geopolitical ripples across the Horn of Africa and beyond. Formalized in Taipei, this pact transcends a simple technical arrangement, representing a potent political and strategic statement that accelerates regional realignment. It establishes anew and distinct fault line in a volatile maritime chokepoint, directly intertwining a long-standing localsovereignty dispute with the overarching strategic competition between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

The agreement is the culmination of two parallel quests for international legitimacy. For Somaliland, a de factostate since its 1991 declaration of independence from Somalia, the pact is a sophisticated maneuver in its 34-year struggle for recognition. For Taiwan, facing relentless diplomatic and military pressure from Beijing, it exemplifies an innovative foreign policy designed to circumvent international isolation. By forging asubstantive security partnership, these two unrecognized entities are creating powerful de facto realities thatchallenge the de jure global order, transforming the Horn of Africa into a new and more volatile theater forgreat power competition.

The Pact’s Architecture: From Aid to Partnership 

The agreement was meticulously crafted to elevate the Taiwan-Somaliland relationship from one of development aid to a genuine strategic partnership, with a clear intent to build tangible, sovereign capabilities for Somaliland.¹ Its provisions are structured around three core pillars: maritime security,technology transfer, and economic development.

• Maritime Security Enhancement: The central objective is to bolster the defense of Somaliland’sextensive 850-kilometer coastline along the Gulf of The pact includes joint training exercises,personnel exchanges, and coordinated maritime rescue operations. A key focus is on strengthening maritime law enforcement and anti-piracy measures to combat illicit activities such as illegal fishing,arms smuggling, and human trafficking.

• Technology and Equipment Transfer: Taiwan has committed to providing advanced maritime hardware and cutting-edge surveillance systems. This includes small-vessel radar networks and encrypted coastal surveillance tools, which represent a significant leap in Hargeisa’s capacity to monitor its maritime domain. The goal is to build a self-sustaining, sovereign security capability rather than a dependency on external forces.

• Economic Cooperation: The agreement is explicitly linked to unlocking the potential of Somaliland’s”blue ” Its waters hold an estimated potential annual fish catch of over 200,000 metric tons,along with untapped mineral resources.¹ Taiwan, through its International Cooperation and Development Fund (ICDF), will provide technical expertise in sustainable fisheries management and maritime infrastructure development to create jobs and stimulate trade.¹

This structure marks a fundamental departure from previous international assistance. Historically, support from missions like the European Union’s EUCAP Somalia was “Somalia-centric,” channeled through frameworks that implicitly reinforced Mogadishu’s sovereignty claims over Somaliland. This created “political friction” and limited aid to administrative seminars rather than building genuine operational capacity. The pact with Taiwan, however, operates on a “fundamentally different plane” as a direct bilateral agreement between entities treating each other as equals. By engaging in security cooperation with the “hallmarks of agenuine state-to-state partnership,” Somaliland is performing a deliberate act of “enacting sovereignty”. This is a sophisticated strategy where the functional attributes of a state are built through defacto actions, creating a new reality on the ground designed to challenge an international system that denies formal status.

Somaliland’s Calculus: Sovereignty Through Pragmatism

For the government in Hargeisa, the agreement is a “masterstroke of pragmatic diplomacy”. It reflects a decisive policy evolution under President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi (Cirro), whose administration has moved from earlier skepticism to a full embrace of the partnership, calculating that its tangible benefits outweigh the inevitable backlash from Mogadishu and Beijing.

Somaliland’s strategy is to leverage great power competition as a pathway to recognition. It recognizes that formal recognition from major powers is unlikely in the near term due to the international community’s adherence to a “One-Somalia” policy and deference to the African Union. Hargeisa has therefore identifiedthe US-China rivalry as the dominant global dynamic it can use to its advantage. By consciously positioning itself as a “steadfast democratic partner” to the West, it makes itself indispensable in a critical region. This alignment is underscored by its explicit rejection of China’s “debt-trap diplomacy,” having turned down Chinese development packages that were conditional on severing ties with Taipei. The strategy is to prove its utility asa reliable, anti-China bulwark, thereby creating an undeniable case for greater US support and, eventually, some form of political legitimacy. It is a calculated gambit to transform its geostrategic location from ageographic fact into a powerful political asset.

Taiwan’s Gambit: A New Frontier in Diplomacy 

For Taiwan, the Somaliland pact is a cornerstone of President Lai Ching-te’s proactive and assertive foreign policy. Facing a relentless campaign of diplomatic strangulation by Beijing, which has left it with only a handful of formal allies, Taipei has developed an offensive strategy of “non-recognition diplomacy”.¹ This approach involves building substantive, official-like relationships with entities that do not formally recognize Taiwan,based on shared values and mutual interests. The partnership with Somaliland, another unrecognized but defacto sovereign state, is a perfect embodiment of this model, much like its burgeoning ties with Lithuania.

This is not merely a defensive measure for survival; it is about actively reshaping the geopolitical landscape.The choice of Somaliland provides Taipei with a strategic foothold at the Bab al-Mandab strait, a choke point for approximately 12% of global trade, giving it influence where it previously had none. It is an offensivediplomatic play, planting a Taiwanese flag in a region of vital importance to China’s Belt and Road Initiativeand establishing a “first-mover advantage” for Taiwanese enterprises seeking to expand into Africa. Thepartnership is consistently framed as an alliance of “democratic resilience” against “authoritarian regimes,” aclear reference to the PRC.¹ President Lai’s stated goal of working with partners to achieve a “non-red Somaliland coastline”—one not dominated by China—explicitly casts the relationship as part of a broader ideological contest, allowing Taiwan to build solidarity with other democracies.

The Axis of Opposition: China and Somalia’s Coordinated Response 

The reactions from Beijing and Mogadishu to the pact have been swift, coordinated, and rooted in a sharedopposition to what both perceive as separatism.¹

• China’s Position: From Beijing’s perspective, the agreement is an “egregious violation” of itssacrosanct “One-China Principle”. The PRC views any official exchange between Taiwan and otherstates as an endorsement of Taiwanese independence and has condemned the pact as “separatistcollusion”.¹ Beijing’s strategy is to enforce a diplomatic quarantine to deny Taiwan any semblance of international legitimacy, and it has consistently backed Somalia’s position to reinforce the authority ofthe government in

• Somalia’s Position: The government in Mogadishu, which has never recognized Somaliland’sindependence, frames the agreement as a “blatant violation” of its national sovereignty and territorial integrity.¹ Somali officials have accused Taiwan of “fomenting regional instability” and supporting the “fragmentation of the Somali nation”.¹ ForMogadishu, the pact is a direct security threat that emboldens a secessionist region, undermining the”One-Somalia” principle upheld by the UN and AU.

A History of Failed Inducements and Hardening Stances 

China’s opposition predates the 2025 pact. When Taiwan and Somaliland first established representative offices in 2020, Beijing launched a campaign to scuflle the partnership, offering Hargeisa a substantial development package on the condition that it sever ties with Taipei. Somaliland’s “firm rejection” of this offer was a significant diplomatic setback for Beijing and signaled a long-term strategic commitment to its new alliance.

This history reveals a crucial dynamic: the backfire effect of coercion. After its inducement strategy failed, Beijing and its partner Mogadishu shifted to more punitive measures. In April 2025, with strong diplomatic support from China, Somalia banned all individuals holding Taiwanese passports from entering its territory,explicitly citing UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 to justify the move. China’s foreign ministry publicly commended the decision, while Taiwan responded with a reciprocal ban. However, rather than deterring thetwo partners, this pressure campaign catalyzed a more defiant and solidified alliance. The signing of the full-fledged coast guard agreement just three months later can be seen as a direct and strategic response, signaling that coercion had not only failed but had accelerated the very partnership it was meant to prevent.

A Direct Challenge to China’s Regional Strategy 

The Taiwan-Somaliland alliance fundamentally undermines China’s broader strategic objectives in the Horn ofAfrica. It disrupts Beijing’s strategy of using its relationship with the recognized government in Mogadishu as aproxy to contain both Taiwan and Somaliland.¹ The pact creates a democratic, pro-Western anchor in a regionof immense importance to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, offering an alternative development model thatcould divert trade and investment away from Chinese-backed projects. Furthermore, it creates a direct security challenge by establishing a friendlyport and a capable, Taiwanese-trained coast guard in the immediate vicinity of China’s sole overseas military base in Djibouti, complicating Beijing’s security calculations in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.

Regional Tremors: The Pact’s Impact on the Horn of Africa

The Taiwan–Somaliland agreement did not occur in a vacuum. It landed in a regional environment already destabilized by the January 2024 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Ethiopia and Somaliland. That historic, though not yet ratified, deal promised landlocked Ethiopia access to a naval base on Somaliland’s coast in exchange for Ethiopia eventually becoming the first UN member state to recognize Somaliland’s independence. The MoU reconfigured regional alliances, creating a diplomatic bloc pitting Ethiopia and Somaliland against an enraged Somalia, which quickly garnered support from Ethiopia’s rivals, Egypt and Eritrea.

The Taiwan pact acts as a strategic hedge for Somaliland within this volatile context. No longer solelydependent on the “controversial and politically risky” deal with Ethiopia, Hargeisa now has a second powerful and technologically advanced partner.¹ This diversification of partnerships reduces its vulnerability and grantsit greater leverage and flexibility. Hargeisa can now pursue a multi-pronged diplomatic strategy rather thanbefling its entire future on the Ethiopian promise of recognition, thereby increasing its strategic autonomy inthe region’s complex power games.

Djibouti’s Dilemma: An Existential Economic and Security Threat 

For the Republic of Djibouti, the empowerment of Somaliland represents a direct and potentially existentialthreat, prompting a hostile reaction. Djibouti’s economy is overwhelmingly dependent on revenue from its ports, which handle approximately 95% of trade for Ethiopia. The rise of Somaliland’s Port of Berbera—modernized with investment from the UAE’s DP World and now positioned as the gateway for the Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU—directly threatens this lucrative monopoly.¹ The World Bank’s 2023 Container Port Performance Index starkly illustrates this challenge: Berbera ranked 82nd globally for efficiency, while Djibouti’s port was ranked a dismal 382nd.

The stakes are so high that Djibouti’s response has reportedly escalated from diplomatic protest to kineticaction. After shuflering Somaliland’s diplomatic mission in its capital, Djibouti has been publicly accused by Somaliland’s president of engaging in proxy warfare.¹ The accusation claims Djibouti is arming communities and supporting the “Awdal State Movement,” a unionist militia, to destabilize western Somaliland and undermine the Ethiopia-Somaliland corridor. This indicates that regional actors may be willing to employ gray-zone tactics to protect their core economic interests, dramatically increasing the risk of regional destabilization.

The United States: A Policy of  “Strategic Ambiguity Plus”

The United States’ position on the pact is a study in strategic ambiguity, marked by a divergence between itsofficial policy and its de facto strategic interests. Officially, the State Department maintains a “One-Somalia”policy, recognizing the government in Mogadishu as the sole sovereign authority and deferring to the AfricanUnion on questions of recognition. However, this stance is increasingly at odds with a powerful consensus in Washington that views Somaliland as a stable, democratic “island of stability” and a crucial partner forcountering China’s influence, which is anchored by its naval base in Djibouti.

This strategic calculus has led to a policy that can be described as outsourcing containment. The US government’s reaction to the pact is telling: while it was quick to condemn the Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU over stability concerns, it has remained conspicuously silent on theTaiwan-Somaliland security agreement, a silence widely interpreted as tacit approval. This approach allows the US to navigate a diplomatic dilemma. The State Department maintains the official “One-Somalia” policy,avoiding the diplomatic fallout of recognizing a breakaway state. Simultaneously, by offering quietencouragement and allowing Congress to provide diplomatic top-cover through legislation and hearings,Washington enables its two unofficial democratic partners, Taiwan and Somaliland, to do the “risky on-the-ground work” of challenging Beijing’s influence. It is a low-cost, plausibly deniable strategy that achieves USobjectives without commifling formal diplomatic capital.

The International Community: Bound by Precedent and Paralysis

The world’s formal institutions of global governance, the African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN),remain on the sidelines, rendered inert by their foundational principles and the realities of great power politics.

• The African Union’s Dilemma: The AU is bound by its core principle of upholding the sanctity of colonial-era borders, a doctrine designed to prevent endless secessionist conflicts.¹ Although a 2005 AU fact-finding mission produced a report favorable to Somaliland’s unique historical case, the organizationremains fearful of the “Pandora’s box” precedent that recognition would It therefore consistentlydefers to its member state, Somalia.¹

• The United Nations’ Constraints: The UN is even more constrained by its state-centriccharter and the political power of the PRC, a permanent, veto-wielding member of the Security Council. Beijing has successfully promoted its interpretation of UNGeneral Assembly Resolution 2758 as the international legal basis for its “One-China Principle,” are solution both China and Somalia have cited to condemn the pact as illegitimate.¹ Given China’s position ,any UN action that could be construed as legitimizing the agreement is a political impossibility, a fact confirmed by the complete absence of any mention of the pact in official UN press briefings.

This institutional paralysis creates a governance vacuum. The formal international system is ill-equipped tohandle conflicts driven by the intersection of great power rivalry and the aspirations of unrecognized actors.This vacuum is being filled by pragmatic and often destabilizing bilateral arrangements like the Taiwan-Somaliland pact, which serves as a stark illustration of the growing gap between the de jure international order and emerging de facto geopolitical realities.

Strategic Outlook: Scenarios and Policy Recommendations 

The Taiwan-Somaliland coast guard agreement has solidified a new flashpoint in the Horn of Africa, creating amulti-layered arena where local, regional, and global conflicts now intersect and amplify one another. The dispute over Somaliland’s status has been internationalized as a volatile theater for the strategic competitionbetween the United States and China. The following matrix consolidates the positions and motivations of thekey stakeholders shaping this new landscape.

Future Scenarios (2025-2030)

The interplay of these interests suggests three potential pathways for the region’s future ¹:

1. Scenario 1: Pragmatic The pact is implemented quietly, improving Somaliland’ssecurity and economy. Protests from China and Somalia remain rhetorical, and major conflict is avoided.The US provides discreet support, while the region remains tense but stable.

2. Scenario 2: Contained Escalation. China and Somalia actively work to undermine the pactthrough gray-zone tactics, including economic sabotage, cyber-aflacks, and covert support forunionist Djibouti may engage in low-level proxy actions. Tensions rise significantly, but directstate-on-state conflict is contained by major powers.

3. Scenario 3: Great Power Proxy Contest. This is the most dangerous scenario. The US formalizes trilateral cooperation with Taiwan and Somaliland through joint exercises or a liaison Viewing thisas a crossing of its red lines, China dramatically escalates military and economic support for Somalia,transforming the Horn of Africa into an overt theater for US-China competition with a high risk of regional war.

Strategic Recommendations fior Western Policymakers (US/EU) To navigate this volatile landscape, Western policymakers should pursue a nuanced strategy that advances their interests while mitigating the risk of large-scale conflict :

1. Adopt a Policy of “Strategic Ambiguity “ Maintain the official

“One-Somalia” position while quietly and systematically deepening pragmatic engagement withHargeisa across security, economic, and governance sectors. This allows for the building of a strong, pro-Western partner without incurring the immense diplomatic cost of unilateral recognition.

2. Support Trilateral and Multilateral Cooperation. Provide technical and financial support forcooperation between the US, Taiwan, and Somaliland on areas of clear mutual benefit, such asmaritime security and counter-terrorism. This provides a multilateral umbrella that makes the supportmore politically

3. Invest in De-escalation and Regional Diplomacy. Proactively engage with Djibouti and Somaliato address their legitimate concerns and prevent the situation from spiraling into open Thiscould involve offering alternative development assistance or facilitating back-channel communication toestablish clear red lines.

4. Frame Support Around International Norms. Publicly and consistently frame engagement withSomaliland as a policy of rewarding good governance, promoting democracy, and enhancing security in avital international By focusing on Somaliland’s functional merits rather than its legal status,Western powers can build a valuable partnership while navigating the complex politics of recognition.

About the Author

Abdiqadir Jama, popularly known as Fartaag, is a seasoned Somaliland political figure and analyst specializing in the geopolitical dynamics of the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea corridor. He currently holds the position of special advisor to chairman of KAAH Party of Somaliland

Reach on X @AFartaaag

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the Horndiplomat editorial policy.

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