Geography, Not Rivalry, Defines Saudi Arabia’s Strategic Constraints

By: Abdillahi Gaboose

Saudi Arabia’s regional behavior is often interpreted through the lenses of rivalry, ambition, or leadership competition. Such readings miss a more fundamental reality: geography, not politics, is the primary constraint shaping Saudi Arabia’s strategic posture.

Despite its extensive coastline along both the Red Sea and the Arabian Gulf, Saudi Arabia’s access to global maritime trade is governed by three external chokepoints—the Suez Canal, the Strait of Hormuz, and Bab al-Mandeb. None are under Saudi control, and all are influenced by actors whose strategic priorities only partially align with Riyadh’s.

Structural Dependence on Maritime Chokepoints

Saudi Arabia’s maritime exposure is defined by three critical corridors:

• The Gulf of Aqaba, where access is constrained by Israel’s control of maritime security and port access at the northern Red Sea.

• The Strait of Hormuz, where logistical dominance and port infrastructure are increasingly shaped by the UAE and its regional partnerships.

• Bab al-Mandeb, where security and access are influenced by Horn of Africa actors, including Somaliland, alongside extra-regional powers with expanding naval and commercial footprints.

Collectively, these realities produce an unusual condition in geopolitics: Saudi Arabia is functionally sea-locked despite being surrounded by water. Its energy exports, trade flows, and supply chains remain structurally dependent on routes it does not control.

This reality explains Riyadh’s persistent strategic anxiety far more convincingly than narratives centered on prestige or rivalry.

The Emerging Maritime Network

A loose but consequential alignment involving Israel, the UAE, India, and Somaliland has reshaped the logistical and security environment surrounding these chokepoints. While not a formal alliance, this network collectively influences ports, maritime surveillance, undersea infrastructure, and trade corridors stretching from the eastern Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean.

For Saudi Arabia, this configuration raises structural concerns over:

• Energy export security

• Supply-chain resilience

• Long-term strategic autonomy

Crucially, these concerns are geographic and logistical, not ideological.

NEOM as Geopolitical Adjustment

Within this context, the NEOM project—including The Line—should be understood less as a futuristic economic experiment and more as a strategic adaptation to regional geopolitics.

NEOM’s northwest location places it adjacent to Israel-anchored logistics, energy, and technology corridors emerging in the eastern Mediterranean and northern Red Sea. Riyadh is fully aware of these dynamics and has positioned NEOM to capture spillover benefits from Israel-linked infrastructure, trade flows, and security stabilization rather than remain excluded from them.

Rather than bypassing chokepoints, NEOM represents an attempt to reposition Saudi Arabia within an evolving regional order—one in which Israel’s maritime and logistical role is increasingly central. This reflects adjustment, not denial, of geographic constraints.

Why Confrontation Is Strategically Counterproductive

Escalating tensions with the UAE would not alleviate Saudi Arabia’s vulnerabilities. On the contrary, fragmentation would increase exposure at chokepoints already beyond Saudi control.

Current arrangements allow Saudi exports relatively predictable passage through Hormuz and onward routes. Disrupting relations with key logistical intermediaries risks converting managed dependence into acute vulnerability.

Saudi outreach to Djibouti and exploratory discussions regarding access along the Gulf of Aden reflect efforts to diversify options. Yet these initiatives do not eliminate chokepoint dependence; they merely redistribute exposure within a tightly interconnected system.

The Limits of Non-Maritime Alternatives

Proposals emphasizing air corridors via Turkey or Pakistan misunderstand the scale of the challenge. Air transport offers strategic flexibility but cannot substitute for maritime trade in volume, cost, or efficiency.

Energy exports, industrial supply chains, and bulk commodities remain fundamentally maritime.

Air power is tactical. Maritime access is structural.

Conclusion: Managing Geography, Not Resisting It

Saudi Arabia’s strategic dilemma is rooted in geography, not diplomacy.

The rational response is cooperation, redundancy, and regional accommodation—not confrontation. Stability among key maritime actors preserves access; fragmentation amplifies exposure.

In a region defined by chokepoints, power lies not in controlling geography, but in managing dependence within it. Saudi Arabia’s long-term strategic success will depend on how effectively it adapts to these constraints—rather than attempting to overcome them through rivalry alone.

About the Author

Abdillahi Gaboose is an independent researcher and political analyst focused on the Horn of Africa and the Middle East. Based in London, his work examines regional geopolitics, maritime security, statehood, and strategic competition across the Red Sea and Gulf corridors.

He can be followed on X (Twitter) @Guntigaab and reached via email at Gaboose16@gmail.com

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the Horndiplomat editorial policy.
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