The flag of Somaliland is raised over Cardiff Castle
By: Khadar Mariano
Introduction
The Republic of Somaliland’s hybrid governance model is often described as a political innovation born from necessity. In the early 1990s, after years of a liberation struggle, Somaliland created a system that blended traditional authority with formal institutions. The result was a political framework that delivered peace when the region had little reason to expect it. That achievement remains real. It stabilized a traumatized society and enabled the creation of an administrative apparatus almost from scratch.
But systems designed to address immediate instability tend to carry long-term liabilities if they do not evolve. The model that brought Somaliland through post-war reconstruction now faces pressures that reveal its limits. These pressures are not the product of ideological conflict. They come from institutional stagnation, demographic change, and the widening gap between political behavior and constitutional design. The hybrid model has not adapted to the demands of a more complex political economy, and that misalignment has produced a quiet erosion of effectiveness.
The Return of Clan Dominance
The constitution imagined a political system where clan identity would gradually lose its centrality. The design of national parties was deliberately restrictive. By limiting the number of parties, Somaliland hoped to avoid the fragmentation seen elsewhere in the region and to pressure politicians into forming broad coalitions. The expectation was that over time political competition would shift from clan-centered bargaining to programmatic engagement.
That expectation proved optimistic. Clan influence has not faded. It has reorganized itself. Rather than competing informally on the margins of politics, clans now operate inside the structures of political parties. Candidate selection has become a negotiation between elders long before party conventions are held. Internal primaries, which should belong to party members, often take place within clan forums. This has created a political paradox. The formal system presents itself as democratic and multi-party, yet the real contest occurs within informal networks that exist outside the constitutional framework.
The implications are consequential. Policies rarely drive electoral behavior. Party platforms become secondary to genealogical alliances. Most importantly, formal institutions lose the authority to shape political incentives. Politicians answer less to party discipline than to clan expectations. A system that was meant to tame clan politics has been captured by it.
Institutional Weakness and Administrative Fragility
The second pressure point is administrative. Effective governance requires a civil service capable of executing policies consistently and on merit. In Somaliland, the logic of clan distribution has seeped into civil service recruitment and promotion. Ministries struggle to retain technical talent because loyalty and lineage overshadow competence. This creates discontinuity. Each political cycle brings personnel changes that disrupt institutional memory.
When civil services are weak, two consequences follow. First, policy implementation becomes irregular. Ministries can produce strategies, but they cannot convert them into functioning systems. Second, political leaders become overly central to administrative outcomes. In countries with strong institutions, leadership changes do not derail programs. In Somaliland, leadership rotation often resets them.
This fragility is not primarily a budget problem. Somaliland has demonstrated administrative potential in areas where leadership has been consistent and technical teams have been allowed to operate. The deeper issue is the absence of structures that shield the state from the political logic of clan distribution. Without such insulation, institutional development cannot outpace political fragmentation.
The Fragile Foundations of Accountability
Formal accountability systems in Somaliland operate in a dense environment of informal expectations. Courts, parliamentary oversight bodies and anti-corruption agencies all exist, but their autonomy is often questioned due to political influence or social pressure. Kinship networks can mobilize on behalf of individuals under scrutiny. Elders can intervene. Communities may prioritize internal solidarity over adherence to formal procedures.
This does not mean Somaliland lacks a sense of justice. It means accountability is negotiated. Consequences depend not only on legal criteria but also on the willingness of political and social actors to tolerate them. In such environments, corruption becomes difficult to address, not because society accepts it, but because the institutional tools designed to confront it have limited reach.
The absence of predictable accountability reduces public trust. Citizens judge governance not by the sophistication of its laws but by the consistency of its enforcement.
Political Exclusion and Its Long-Term Costs
Somaliland’s demographic structure deepens the problem. The majority of the population is young, but youth representation in politics remains minimal. Women remain excluded from most decision-making forums. Minority clans hold even less space. These exclusion patterns were understandable during the state’s formative stage. Elders were trusted, and stability required their involvement. But as politics institutionalizes, lack of inclusivity becomes a liability.
A political system that does not incorporate its largest demographic groups cannot maintain relevance. Youth are often more informed, more mobile, and more exposed to global political norms than the leadership class. Their marginalization creates a disconnect between institutions and society. That disconnect is already visible in the contrast between online political engagement and formal political participation.
In political development theory, legitimacy is sustainable only when it is renewable. Somaliland risks losing the mechanism that renews legitimacy if it does not widen the participatory space.
The Absence of a Transition Roadmap
The most important analytical point concerns the absence of a long-term constitutional roadmap. The hybrid model emerged as a temporary solution to post-conflict realities. It was not built to serve as a permanent design. The architects assumed that once stability took root, the system would be reformed and formalized. That evolution never happened. Instead, temporary mechanisms hardened into tradition.
The lack of a transition framework has produced two interconnected risks. The first is institutional drift. Without a shared understanding of what the state should become, political reforms become isolated initiatives rather than components of a broader transformation.
The second is constitutional unpredictability. Key institutions, such as the Guurti, continue to exercise powers that were originally intended for emergencies. When those powers are used during normal political cycles, public trust fluctuates sharply.
A hybrid system can function effectively, but only when its evolution is shaped by a clear vision and a collective understanding of the respective roles of traditional authority and modern institutions in a changing society.
Conclusion
The Republic of Somaliland’s hybrid governance served its purpose during a period when few countries in the region could claim stability. It delivered peace and allowed a fledgling state to take shape. But a system that succeeds in one historical context does not automatically succeed in another. The hybrid model has reached a point where its original strengths now generate its principal vulnerabilities.
The conclusion is straightforward. Somaliland does not need a different identity. It needs a different trajectory. It must move from reliance on informal authority to predictable institutional practice without losing the cultural legitimacy that has kept it cohesive. Achieving that balance is difficult, but the alternative is a gradual thinning of state capacity and a political order that relies more on memory than on governance.
Author’s Note: The analysis presented in this article is adapted from remarks I originally delivered during a panel discussion organized by Qalinmaal Publishing titled The Interplay Between Somaliland’s Modern Institutions and Traditional Authority Structures. The written version expands those arguments and frames them in a broader analytical context.
About the Author
Khadar Mariano is a development practitioner whose work and writing explore the intersection of governance, policy, democracy, and community empowerment.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the Horndiplomat editorial policy.
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