By: Abdirarshid Jeeni
In the volatile landscape of the Horn of Africa, the question of Somaliland’s international recognition has long been a contentious issue. Somaliland, an independent state since reclaimed its independence in 1991 following the collapse of the Somali Democratic Republic, has maintained de facto sovereignty, building a stable democracy with regular elections, its own currency, military and effective governance. Despite this, it remains unrecognized by the international community, largely due to Somalia’s insistence on unrealistic territorial claims.
In this article, I argue that recognizing Somaliland would not spell political catastrophe for Somalia. Instead, it will formalize an existing reality, alleviate burdens on Mogadishu, and open doors to regional cooperation. This article explores why such recognition is far from doomsday, outlines how Somalia could prosper, and draws parallels with Djibouti’s supportive role, suggesting Somaliland could follow suit.
The notion that Somaliland’s recognition would dismantle Somalia overlooks the ground reality: the two entities have operated separately for over three decades. Somaliland’s stability contrasts sharply with Somalia’s ongoing struggles against insurgency, clan conflicts, and governance challenges. Recognition would merely acknowledge this separation, which has persisted despite Somalia’s claims.
Critically, it will reduce the risk of armed conflict by establishing clear boundaries and diplomatic channels for resolving disputes, such as intelligence and resource sharing. This formalization would prevent escalation from simmering tensions, fostering a more predictable regional environment. Somalia’s government in Mogadishu, already stretched thin by al-Shabaab and internal divisions, expends political capital on denying Somaliland’s autonomy—a distraction that recognition could eliminate. Far from weakening Somalia, recognition would allow Mogadishu to redirect focus inward, strengthening its institutions without the illusion of controlling a country it hasn’t governed since the early 1990s.
Moreover, international recognition of Somaliland aligns with precedents like South Sudan’s secession from Sudan in 2011, which, despite challenges, enabled both nations to pursue tailored development paths. In Somalia’s case, it wouldn’t fragment a unified state but ratify a long-standing seperation, potentially enhancing Somalia’s credibility by demonstrating maturity in accepting pragmatic solutions.
Pathways for Somalia to Prosper Post-Recognition
Somalia’s prosperity need not hinge on reclaiming Somaliland; in fact, recognition could unlock advantages. Here are key points illustrating how Somalia could thrive:
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Resource Reallocation and Internal Focus: Somalia currently allocates diplomatic and military efforts to counter Somaliland’s independence bids, resources better spent on combating al-Shabaab, improving infrastructure, and fostering economic growth in the south. With recognition, Mogadishu could prioritize federalism reforms, enhancing governance in regions like Puntland and Jubaland, leading to more effective aid utilization and investor confidence.
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Economic Partnerships and Trade Opportunities: A recognized Somaliland would become a sovereign neighbor, enabling formal trade agreements. Somaliland’s Berbera Port, already a hub with UAE investments, could serve as a complementary gateway for Somali goods, reducing reliance on other ports. This could boost cross-border commerce in livestock, fisheries, and more—shared economic pillars for both. Recognition might also grant Somaliland access to international financial institutions, indirectly benefiting Somalia through regional economic integration and reduced competition for aid.
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Enhanced Regional Security: Somaliland has demonstrated prowess in containing threats like al-Shabaab and piracy, maintaining relative peace through community-based policing. As a recognized state, it could formalize security cooperation with Somalia, sharing intelligence and coordinating anti-terrorism efforts. This would create a buffer zone, stabilizing the Horn of Africa and attracting more international support for joint initiatives, ultimately lightening Somalia’s security burden.
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Diplomatic Leverage and Stability: Recognition will encourage dialogue on shared issues like migration and environmental challenges, turning potential adversaries into allies. Somalia might gain from Somaliland’s diplomatic networks, such as its ties with United States, United Kingdom, Europe, Ethiopia and Taiwan, fostering a multi-polar approach to regional influence rather than zero-sum rivalry.
In essence, Somalia stands to gain by embracing Somaliland as a partner, much like how post-colonial African states have benefited from cooperative borders.
Learning from Djibouti: A Model for Somaliland’s Potential Role
Djibouti, a small but strategically vital neighbor sharing ethnic Somali demographics and historical ties with both Somalia and Somaliland, exemplifies how a separate state can support Somalia without undermining it. Djibouti has been a steadfast ally to Somalia, providing multifaceted assistance that Somaliland could emulate post-recognition.
Djibouti’s support has been instrumental in Somalia’s stabilization. Militarily, it has contributed troops to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) since 2011, with a contingent of around 960 soldiers based in Beledweyne, aiding in counter-insurgency operations against al-Shabaab. This commitment continued into the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), and in July 2025, Djibouti signed an agreement for additional troop deployments, reaffirming its dedication to Somali peace and security. Diplomatically, Djibouti has hosted multiple rounds of talks between Somalia and Somaliland, including in 2023 and 2024, facilitating dialogue on unity and cooperation. Economically and humanitarily, it provides port access for Somali trade, hosts refugees, and offers aid during crises, such as evacuating flood-affected families in Somalia. These efforts stem from shared interests in regional stability, given Djibouti’s vulnerability to spillover from Somali instability.
Somaliland, with its own Somali heritage and stability, could mirror and add more to this supportive role. Post-recognition, it might contribute to AU missions in Somalia, leveraging its security expertise to bolster anti-terrorism efforts. Somaliland could host mediation talks or provide humanitarian corridors. Economically, enhanced Berbera Port operations will contribute, offering Somalia diversified trade routes and joint ventures in fisheries and energy. Recent overtures, such as Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi’s 2025 visit to Djibouti to mend ties, indicate potential for trilateral cooperation. Ultimately, a recognized Somaliland would likely prioritize stability to protect its sovereignty, much as Djibouti has, turning historical kinship into practical alliances.
Conclusion: From Division to Shared Prosperity
Recognizing Somaliland is not a harbinger of doom for Somalia but an opportunity to redefine their relationship as equals. By shedding the weight of unattainable unity, Somalia can concentrate on its core challenges, while gaining a reliable neighbor for trade, security, and diplomacy. Somaliland ability to provide support, diplomatic mediation, and economic partnership—shows how separation can breed solidarity. In a region plagued by conflict, this pragmatic approach could pave the way for a more prosperous Horn of Africa, where former union gives way to fruitful collaboration. The path forward lies in dialogue, not denial, ensuring both entities thrive independently yet interdependently.
About the Author
Abdirashid Jeeni, Policy Analyst ,London School of Economics and Political Science
Somaliland tourism
X: @AbdiJeeni