By Rooble Mohamed
In a recent opinion piece published by Asharq Al-Awsat, Somalia President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud outlined Somalia’s ambition to protect the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, highlighting the need for regional and international cooperation in tackling maritime threats, from piracy to terrorism. The President also emphasized Somalia’s ongoing struggle against violent extremist groups like Al-Shabaab and ISIS, framing maritime security as both a national and collective responsibility. While these concerns are valid and the rhetoric of regional solidarity is timely, Somalia’s actual capacity and legitimacy in asserting control over these strategic waters—especially in relation to Somaliland—require closer scrutiny.
Somaliland, which declared withdrawal of the 1960 unity with Somalia in 1991, governs a large stretch of the Gulf of Aden’s coastline—approximately 850 kilometers. It operates with its own government, laws, military, and institutions, and has achieved a level of stability and governance unmatched in many parts of southern Somalia. More significantly, Somaliland is entirely outside the control of the Federal Government of Somalia. There are no Somali National Army troops, federal police, or administrative mechanisms present in Somaliland. Therefore, any claim by Mogadishu to be protecting the waters off Somaliland’s coast is purely theoretical.
For instance, the closest President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has come to the Red Sea was during his visit to the port city of Massawa in Eritrea, where he was photographed inspecting naval facilities and meeting with Eritrean officials. While the visit symbolized diplomatic engagement in regional maritime affairs, it also underscored the irony of Somalia’s claims over Red Sea security—President Mohamud could only observe the waters from afar, on foreign soil, with no operational presence or authority in the strategic maritime corridors he seeks to influence.
This gap between claim and reality undermines Somalia’s message. Maritime authority depends not just on legal declarations but on operational presence, enforcement capability, and functional governance. On all these counts, Somaliland—not Somalia—is the actor effectively managing that segment of the Gulf of Aden. The disconnect between President Hassan Sheikh’s declarations and Somalia’s geographic and political limitations poses a critical challenge to the credibility of its maritime security narrative.
Unlike much of southern and central Somalia, Somaliland has maintained peace and security over the last three decades. Its coast guard and port authority manage maritime traffic and security in their jurisdiction. The Berbera Port, operated under an agreement with DP World, has become a key strategic asset with increasing international relevance. In 2024, Somaliland signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Ethiopia granting access to the Red Sea and utilize Berbera port as a hub for Ethiopia’s imports — a move that further underlines Somaliland’s position and the regional recognition of its strategic significance.
Somalia’s response to the MoU with Ethiopia was swift and uncompromising, framing it as an affront to national sovereignty. Yet this response only served to highlight Mogadishu’s lack of control and leverage in Somaliland. The federal government’s inability to prevent or influence agreements signed within a region it does not govern exposes the limits of its de jure sovereignty.
Moreover, Somaliland’s record in reducing piracy, countering smuggling, and securing commercial shipping lanes makes it a valuable—albeit unrecognized—partner in maritime security. Several international observers and think tanks have pointed to Somaliland as a model of local governance that could play a larger role in ensuring the safety of maritime routes in the Horn of Africa. Continuing to exclude it from formal regional security frameworks risks undermining collective efforts.
The Red Sea and Gulf of Aden are no longer dominated by a single power. A web of international and regional actors—including the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Ethiopia, China, Turkey, and the United States—have established varying levels of influence across these waters. This multipolar environment demands a pragmatic and inclusive approach to maritime security.
Somalia’s insistence on being the sole representative authority for all Somali-inhabited territories in this volatile region ignores these complexities. Any long-term strategy for maritime security must account for the political and operational fragmentation within Somalia itself. While the international community still adheres to the one-Somalia policy in diplomatic forums, many actors are increasingly engaging directly with Somaliland due to its relative stability and governance capacity.
To frame maritime security in binary terms—recognized state vs. secessionist entity—is unhelpful in practice. The waters off Somaliland are not secured by Somalia, and the security challenges they face are being addressed by authorities in Hargeisa. Effective collaboration should not be hostage to unresolved political status issues, especially when regional stability is at stake.
If Somalia truly aims to play a leading role in regional maritime security, it must reconcile its political aspirations with geopolitical realities. This includes recognizing that it does not exercise control over Somaliland, and that any sustainable regional security architecture must include the latter’s participation. Doing so is a practical step toward ensuring that all coastal territories are actively contributing to maritime stability.
Furthermore, Somalia must focus on strengthening its internal governance, expanding its coastal security capabilities in the south, and reducing the influence of violent extremist groups that continue to threaten both land and sea. Rebuilding domestic legitimacy and extending control over federal territories should take precedence over making broad declarations that lack enforcement power.
The international community also has a role to play. Diplomatic recognition and formal statehood should not be the sole criteria for inclusion in security cooperation. As global and regional threats evolve, so too must our frameworks for addressing them. Somaliland’s exclusion from these conversations weakens regional coordination and overlooks a capable actor with a vested interest in maritime security.
Maritime threats in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden—ranging from piracy and terrorism to illegal fishing and arms trafficking—require a united response. But unity cannot be achieved through denial and exclusion. Somalia’s declarations about securing these waters must be grounded in its actual territorial reach and operational capacity. Without acknowledging the role of Somaliland, any security narrative will remain incomplete and ineffective.
If Somalia is serious about regional leadership, it must move beyond symbolic gestures and embrace inclusive, fact-based strategies. Maritime security, like peace, is built on cooperation, not claims.
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Rooble Mohamed is a communications specialist and university lecturer, with a research focus on regional diplomacy and maritime security in the Horn of Africa.
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