Op-Ed: The Missing Link: Somaliland and the Houthi Crisis

Written By Gus Anderson

President Trump’s latest designation of the Houthi group, as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation, does little to counter the Houthi threat.

Whilst the FTO designation mounts pressure on the Houthis in real terms – on humanitarian aid, military supplies, and sanctions, American strategy ought to be more holistic if Trump seeks to “end the meatgrinder” … not just in Ukraine, but Yemen too.

The FTO designation must be the first step in a series of missing pieces that previous administrations have failed to focus on; a strategy that focuses on the entire puzzle across the Middle East and further south in the Horn of Africa.

Houthi Attacks Simmer

The Houthi attacks in the Red Sea continue to affect ‘Israeli-aligned’ vessels despite a reprieve following a fragile ceasefire in Gaza.

The past few weeks alone saw dangerous developments as the Houthis reportedly fired their first surface-to-air missiles at American F-15 fighter jets over the Gulf of Aden. Whilst the real threat to maritime shipping has lowered, following the ceasefire in Gaza, ‘Israeli-aligned’ vessels continue to avoid the Red Sea route because of ongoing Houthi threats to resume attacks.

Such developments reinforce the ineffectiveness of U.S. actions on Yemen amidst previous military airstrikes, new U.S. sanctions – alongside UK and Israeli allies – and coalition maritime efforts via Operation Prosperity Guardian. What else can be done?

Somaliland: The Missing Link

Policymakers must think outside the box and consider the wider political economy beyond the clickbait of ‘Iran’ as the culprit for all things Houthi.

Growing ties to Al-Qaeda affiliates, namely Al-Shabab in Jubaland and ISIS in Puntland, is one answer. Counterterrorism strategies by Djibouti and Somali policymakers are ignored, in the case of Djibouti, or mismanaged in Somalia’s case.

Djibouti – Houthis

UN Reports highlight Djibouti as a conduit of arms smuggling for Iranian-backed proxies in Lebanon and Yemen, with onward shipment to Al-Shabaab in Somalia.

The Organised Crime Index, a leading independent research institute reporting on arms smuggling, notes the role of Djibouti military, government officials, the African Union Mission in Somalia, and executives of state-owned enterprises tied to companies engaged in sponsoring and aiding the trafficking of arms in the Horn of Africa.

However, the Djibouti government firmly rejects all accusations of arms smuggling via Doraleh despite repeated independent reports confirming arms shipments between Khokha district in Yemen, to Doraleh, bound for ports under Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda control in northern Somalia.

U.S. State Treasury reports also confirms the use of Iranian proxies, in the Levant namely Hizbullah, using frontal companies flagged in Djibouti and Liberia as a means of bypassing international sanctions to generate oil-sourced revenues.

Djibouti – Al-Shabaab

Recent efforts to rebrand, renew, and reinvigorate a failed African Union Mission in Somalia has come up against a resurgence in Al-Shabaab attacks in the country whilst Somali Security Forces’ efforts are underfunded and divided amidst clan-divisions between Mogadishu and Jubaland.

Policy Recommendations – Houthi (Non-)State Allies

Therefore, the international community must propose sustainable solutions that target the two main sources and conduits of the Houthi war economy: Djibouti arms smuggling rings and Somali (non-)state actors through Somaliland recognition.

Berbera Port: Investment Decisions

Somaliland’s strategic position, coupled with its democratic trajectory with corruption levels, political rights, and civil liberties scoring far higher than neighbouring states, Djibouti, and Somalia, support foreign investment decisions because of business stability and the rate of return.

Unlike Djibouti, where contracts and profits are routinely siphoned off due to corruption; Berbera port offers an economic opportunity for foreign firms looking for a guaranteed rate of return without any risk of sanctions owing to illicit smuggling and Chinese part-ownership of Doraleh port in Djibouti.

With Trump’s brewing trade war on China and series of daily threats, businesses would be wise to hedge their capital in maritime assets that are shielded from potential sanctions in the medium term.

Berbera Port: Arms to Hodeidah

Berbera’s port also offers the U.S. and GCC allies a viable military vantage point to tackle illegal arms smuggling routes between Djibouti and ports in Yemen: Hodeidah. Houthi controlled ports repeatedly receive shipments from Doraleh without disruption, in turn re-arming Houthi militia.

According to the CEO RISK, Robert Besseling, at the risk management company, of PANGEA-Risk, arms trafficking rings from Djibouti are ongoing with senior military, government, and state-owned enterprises tied to transnational companies participating in arms trafficking across the Horn of Africa.

A firm U.S. presence, with the support of its Emirati allies, would make intelligence, interception, and monitoring of illicit arms smuggling between Djibouti and Yemen easier.

Recent indications suggest that the Trump administration, in coordination with Israeli and Emirati counterparts, are eyeing up Somaliland as part of Project 2025. The UAE has long held a special relationship with Hargeisa, with Israel playing an increasing role though unannounced after normalisation, which is set to increase with warm ties between Trump and GCC states.

Berbera Port: Houthi Regional Economy

Houthi ties to ISIS, Somali pirates, and Al-Shabaab are intertwined. Investment in Berbera port, by an official U.S. and enhanced Emirati presence, could offer additional foreign policy goals for the Trump administration on its neighbour further south: Somalia.

America’s commitment to Somalia following Secretary of State Clinton’s visit in 2011 tied Washington to Mogadishu at great expense.

Despite the African Union’s best efforts to secure Somalia, Al-Shabaab, ISIS, and Somali piracy continues to fight back in overwhelming numbers since 2022. Trump officials should consider Berbera investment as a steppingstone to combat Houthi action whilst offering a justified full withdrawal in U.S. aid and troop commitment in Somalia.

Somaliland: Intelligence Hub

Israeli actions to deter the Houthis come up against stiff resistance on intelligence gathering.

According to some Israeli officials, close to the intelligence community, Israeli aerial bombings on Hodeidah port, last year, failed to achieve the same resounding results that the international community saw in Lebanon, Gaza, and Iran because of intelligence gaps.

Somaliland’s recognition, owing to enhanced military cooperation, between Hargeisa and Tel Aviv would enable counter-terrorism operations inside Yemen with greater accuracy. Bar the obvious geographical distance, between Israel and Yemen, recognition could open the door for intelligence sharing agreements via friendly third parties: the U.S. and UAE.

Somaliland: Counterweight to China and Russia

Whilst Somaliland’s obvious appeal to Sino-sceptics is well known, as one of two states to have relations with Taiwan, recent geopolitical events demonstrate the urgency for recognition.

Russia’s pushback in Syria has pushed back Russia’s influence in the Middle East for decades yet Moscow and Tehran’s recent push to set-up shop in Sudan is a warning sign for Western allies.

Trump’s ad-hoc strategy on Russia and Iran may want to follow a more linear strategy if the U.S., UAE, Israel, and its European allies want to see stability in Syria whilst rolling back a Russia-Iran axis on the rise in Yemen and East Africa.

Horn of Africa: Different Interests, Same Goal

The U.S. may prioritise transactional politics, amongst Trump’s emphasis on deal making, the UAE and Israel may prioritise countering Türkiye in Somalia, whilst Europe may seek to restore its crumbling influence in Africa. Together, however, each actor has a mutual interest when it comes to Yemen.

Recognition of Somaliland offers a sustainable non-military solution that builds on the latest FTO designation, finds solutions to the AU’s failure in Somalia, whilst challenging regional rivals in the Red Sea basin.

The Houthis are an Iranian proxy, but the crisis in Yemen must address the other conduits of Houthi financing otherwise the war in Yemen will continue to rage on.

Allies should reaffirm their engagement, with Hargeisa, through recognition as a geopolitical necessity.

About the Author

Gus Anderson is the Editor-in-Chief of The Daily Euro Times; an online

publication focussed on the Middle East from a European angle. Formerly he was the MENA Editor at the Oxford Diplomatic Dispatch whilst also working in research posts in Hebron, Amman, and Lake Victoria.

He earnt his Master of Philosophy (MPhil) in Modern Middle Eastern studies, with Arabic, at the University of Oxford and is now based between London and Abu Dhabi.

He has words across media sites, think-tanks, and political risk analysis; The Middle East Monitor, Arab Institute for Security Studies (Amman), Pamela Steele Associates (Kenya), Knightsbridge Strategic Group (London), and other outlets across the Middle East and East Africa.

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