By :Khadir Abdilahi Mohamed (Khadir Dhore)
Introduction
Somalia and Ethiopia share one of the longest borders between two countries. Within Ethiopia, a significant population of Somali ethnicity resides in territories historically considered part of the Greater Somali lands that are there. The concept of Greater Somalia, which aims to unify lands divided during the colonial era, has been an enduring aspiration among Somali communities. Colonial powers partitioned Somali territories into five major regions: Somaliland (under British protectorate), Djibouti (a French colony), the Northern Frontier District (NFD) under British rule, Somalia (Italian colony), and Western Somalia (also under British influence). These divisions laid the foundation for lasting challenges in Somali-Ethiopian relations. The diplomatic ties between Somalia and Ethiopia have a long historical background, crossing the pre-colonial, colonial, and modern periods. However, these relations have often been marked by tension and hostility rather than sustained peace and cooperation. Historical records suggest that Somalia and Ethiopia have struggled to maintain stable and effective diplomatic relations. Instead, their interactions have frequently been shaped by conflicts and competing interests.
In 1960, the Somali Republic was formed through the unification of Italian Somaliland and British Somaliland. However, by 1963, Somali guerrillas began an insurgency in Ethiopia’s Ogaden region after the Ethiopian government rejected demands for self-governance. This conflict further escalated tensions between the two nations and strained their diplomatic relations. In 1964, a ceasefire was signed, and both governments agreed to withdraw troops from the border. While this agreement brought a temporary halt to hostilities, the underlying issues remained unresolved. In recent times, there has been renewed hope for improved relations, particularly following efforts to address tensions in border towns such as Tog Wajale. Historically a crisis for conflict, the town has seen renewed focus as Somalia’s fragile government and Ethiopia work to direct their complex relationship. In 1977, Somalia invaded Ethiopia in an attempt to reclaim the Ogaden region, a territory inhabited by ethnic Somalis, but by 1978, Ethiopian forces, with Soviet and Cuban support, bring back the area, marking a significant defeat for Somalia. This loss weakened Somalia’s government, contributing to the instability that ended in the regime’s collapse in 1991, which plunged the nation into civil war. After Somalia’s central government collapsed in January 1991, Somaliland declared independence on May 18, 1991, at the Burao Grand Conference the result of right today Republic of Somaliland. During this time, Ethiopia intervened in Somalia’s internal affairs to protection its own security and counter potential threats from militant groups. In 2006, Ethiopia launched another military intervention to remove the Islamic Courts Union (Ma-Xaakimtii), which had gained control of much of southern Somalia. While these interventions addressed immediate security concerns, they also operated offence and highlighted the deeply stressed relationship between the two countries.
In the 2010s and 2020s, Somalia and Ethiopia made significant efforts to improve their relations. Leaders like Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo and Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed worked towards closer cooperation, focusing on regional stability and development. Both countries also participated in broader Horn of Africa integration efforts, including open-border policies and trilateral agreements with Eritrea. However, tensions rose in early 2024 when Ethiopia signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with Somaliland President H.E. Muse Bihi Abdi to lease part of its coastline for an Ethiopian naval base. Somaliland also exchanged recognition and profit-sharing agreements with Ethio-Telecom and Ethiopian Airlines. Many political analysts view this agreement as a crucial deal for both societies. This move was seen by Somalia’s federal government as a violation of its sovereignty, leading to diplomatic declines. In response, Somalia threatened to dismiss Ethiopian peacekeepers and sought to strengthen ties with Ethiopia’s regional opponents, such as Egypt and Eritrea.
In this discussion, I will provide a brief overview of the history of the Horn of Africa, share my thoughts on what I mean by conspiracy diplomacy, and finally conclude with a detailed analysis of the political assassination of Hassan Sheikh and the release of a controversial portrait, explaining what I meant in each incident.
Key Takeaways
- Somalia and Ethiopia’s relationship has been historically strained due to territorial disputes, especially over the Ogaden region and the Greater Somalia concept.
- Diplomatic tensions escalated in 2024 when Ethiopia signed a deal with Somaliland for a naval base, which Somalia viewed as a threat to its sovereignty.
- Despite efforts for peace, Somalia’s internal politics and regional alliances, including with Egypt and Eritrea, continue to complicate relations with Ethiopia.
Brief History of Horn of Africa Diplomacy
After Somalia gained independence in 1960, it hoped to unite the Somali people who were spread across different countries in the Horn of Africa, including parts of Ethiopia. Somalia’s early foreign policy focused on this goal of uniting all Somali-speaking people, which led to tensions with Ethiopia, especially over the Ogaden region, where many ethnic Somalis lived but were part of Ethiopia. However, relations between the two countries started to worsen, as Somalia began supporting rebels in Ethiopia’s Ogaden region, hoping to achieve the dream of a united Greater Somalia. This led to a border dispute and clashes between the two countries. In 1977, tensions reached a peak when Somalia invaded Ethiopia to take control of the Ogaden region. The war, known as the Ogaden War, saw Somalia attempting to annex the area, but Ethiopia, with help from the Soviet Union and Cuba, successfully pushed back Somali forces. The conflict ended in 1978 with Somalia’s defeat, and the Ogaden region remained under Ethiopian control. During the 1980s, the relationship between Somalia and Ethiopia remained worried. Somalia’s military government, led by Siad Barre, had its focus on defeating rebels and declaring its influence in the region. While both countries had different political systems and governments, both played internal struggles during this period.
In the early 2000s, Somalia and Ethiopia’s relationship changed as both faced the threat of extremist groups like Al-Shabaab. Ethiopia helped the Somali Transitional Federal Government, which was formed to bring stability to Somalia after its civil war. In 2006, Ethiopia sent troops to help fight the Islamic Courts Union (Dawaladihii Maxaakimta), which had gained power in Somalia. Although Ethiopia’s help was important, it led to more tension and resentment from the Somali people. In 2011, Ethiopia sent troops again to fight Al-Shabaab, but this further strained relations. By the mid-2010s, both countries realized they needed to work together for peace. Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed started rebuilding diplomatic ties, and by 2020, they restored full diplomatic relations, reopening delegations in each other’s capitals. However, in 2024, tensions rose again when Ethiopia signed an agreement with the Republic of Somaliland to build a naval base in exchange for recognizing Somaliland’s independence. Somalia opposed this, seeing it as a threat to its territorial integrity.
Recent Conspiracy Diplomacy
In December 2023, Djibouti hosted a significant meeting between Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and Somaliland President Muse Bihi Abdi, facilitated by Djibouti President Ismail Omar Geele. The discussions aimed to continue dialogue between Somalia and Somaliland, focusing on determining longstanding disputes and enhancing bilateral cooperation. Both parties agreed to develop a roadmap for future discussions, acknowledging previous agreements from meetings held between 2012 and 2020. They also committed to addressing security issues collaboratively, particularly in combating terrorism and resolving emerging disputes.
In January 2024, Somaliland President Muse Bihi Abdi flew to Addis Ababa and confirmed that he is fully committed to carrying out the Memorandum of Understanding signed with Ethiopia, despite facing opposition and outside pressure. He made it clear that the MoU is a deal between Somaliland and Ethiopia and does not involve Somalia’s federal government. President Muse Bihi accused Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud of opposing the agreement and even running a campaign against Ethiopia because of it. He stated, “We have been two separate, independent countries, two governments, for 34 years. Everyone knows this, restating Somaliland’s claim to independence. President Muse Bihi Abdi also pointed out growing tensions in the region due to the agreement. He suggested that Somalia’s alliance with Egypt, which includes a military deal, is part of an effort to stop Somaliland’s push for independence.
While Ethiopia has largely remained silent about the MoU’s progress, Somaliland has made significant steps to implement the deal, including appointing legal and advisory teams. Somalia, however, has strongly opposed the agreement, aligning with Ethiopia’s rivals, such as Egypt and Eritrea, to pressure Ethiopia to reconsider. Muse Bihi criticized Somalia’s actions, claiming they are influenced by Egypt’s regional disputes, particularly over the Nile River, and suggested that Egypt is using Somalia to advance its own interests. Despite these challenges, President Muse Bihi expressed openness to dialogue with Somalia, provided Somaliland’s independence is acknowledged, signaling that mutual recognition could cover the way for constructive discussions. By the end of 2024, Somalia and Ethiopia recognized the importance of resolving their disagreements through open dialogue. With Turkey serving as a mediator, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed agreed to engage in technical discussions to address their differences. These efforts led to an important innovative, as both countries decided to restore full diplomatic representation in each other’s capitals. The dialogue will officially open in February 2025 in Ankara, Turkey. Key points of the agreement include a commitment to return diplomatic ties, collaborate on security and economic matters, and work towards resolving the border dispute peacefully. Both nations also agreed to enhance cooperation on regional issues, including trade, infrastructure, and counter-terrorism efforts. Additionally, they emphasized the importance of respecting each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. However, Somalia expressed concerns, as Ethiopia had not fully committed to ending its previous interventions and violations of Somalia’s sovereignty. Despite this, the agreement signals a mutual commitment to repairing relations and promoting regional stability through peaceful and cooperative means.
One year after the signing of the MoU between Ethiopia and Somaliland in January 2024, significant diplomatic shifts have occurred. In January 2025, Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud visited Ethiopia, signing an effort to improve relations between the two countries. However, the visit raised concerns, especially regarding the controversial MoU that allows Ethiopia to lease a stretch of coastline in Somaliland for a naval base and port. Somalia, which views the MoU as a contravention on its sovereignty, continues to stand secure on the principle of territorial integrity. President Mohamud’s visit, while aimed at restoring diplomatic ties, was seen by some as a contradiction to his earlier attitude that “our sea is not for sale” (Badayaddu iib maha), rejecting any foreign control over Somali territory. This ongoing tension highlights the complexities of Somali diplomacy, as the country directs regional alliances while stressing its sovereignty in the face of external challenges.
Bihi’s MOU with Ethiopia and Hostility towards Hassan Sheikh
Hassan Sheikh did not cla im to defend the sea, as he previously stated that Somalia is responsible. His real intention seemed to be to gain financial benefits based on his personal interests. As far as is known, Hassan Sheikh has repeatedly expressed his strong opposition to the idea that the sea belongs to Somalia, and he has stated that it is not for sale. He has made contradictory statements on various occasions in different places, such as masjids, public gatherings, and other locations. In some Masjids, he referred to Ethiopia as an enemy that invaded Somali territory, saying the people should defend their land and shed their blood. At another time, he suggested that Ethiopia should not approach Somalia and should negotiate, claiming that Somalia would give them the sea. He also stated that Somalia only has two enemies: Ethiopia and Al-Shabaab. If you analyze all these statements, it seems clear that President Hassan Sheikh has not reconsidered his position. This appears to be jealousy towards the progress Somaliland has made, which has achieved democracy, conducted one-person-one-vote elections, strengthened governance structures, unified its land and people, and entered into international agreements, including the one with DP World that has made its ports some of the busiest in Africa, particularly in the Horn of Africa. As we know, in December 2024, the UN endorsed a plan to restart the AU mission for peacekeeping in Somalia, which had been discussed by donors regarding the amount of funding and the challenges in securing enough financial resources for the mission, initially proposed by the UK.
However, there was significant concern from other countries, as they had already heavily invested in the previous peacekeeping mission in Somalia (ATMIS). The intriguing issue here is that Ethiopia was removed from any involvement in matters related to the territorial and maritime sovereignty of Somalia, meaning that Somalia no longer requires Ethiopian forces to be stationed within its borders. This was followed by concerns from Burundian troops about the small number of peacekeepers available, expressing that they would be unable to defend themselves and may withdraw from Somalia. One surprising development was President Hassan Sheikh’s proposal to request Ethiopian troops remain in Somalia, which implies that Somalia still needs Ethiopian troops for its peacekeeping operations. This is seen as contradictory: why remove them before if they are needed now?
This situation is believed to be part of his attempt to fight against regional administrations like Jubaland and Puntland, as part of his personal interests. Some also speculate that he may want to become a dictator in Somalia again. This is seen as resentment of Somaliland’s progress, especially in establishing strong relations with neighboring countries like Ethiopia. This behavior reflects jealousy. Hassan Sheikh is seen as a person who lacks clear political vision and prioritizes his personal ambitions over the country’s needs. Everything seems to be about his personal gain.
The Political Assassination of Hassan Sheikh and the Release of a Controversial Portrait.
Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s slogan, “Our Sea is not for sale,” which he strongly proclaimed one year ago, no longer seems to hold true based on his recent actions. He has opposed Somaliland’s progress, but Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s involvement with Somaliland and the welcoming of Ethiopian naval forces has sent a strong message that Hassan Sheikh’s credibility as a reliable regional ally may now be in question. Egypt and Eritrea, which had previously made alliances with Somalia to protect their territorial sovereignty, may now view Hassan Sheikh differently in light of these changes. Political commanders and observers are confused by President Hassan Sheikh Mahamoud’s visit to Ethiopia. Many wonder if he has forgotten what he said to his people just a year ago, when he stated, “We have two enemies: one is Al-Shabaab, and the other is Ethiopia.” What has changed between then and now? Is it a good idea to engage with either Hassan Sheikh or Abiy Ahmed, considering the potential violation of international law in the process?
The situation raises major questions: Who is responsible for reconciliation, and why did Hassan Sheikh Mahamoud decide to visit Ethiopia? These questions remain unanswered and have left many wondering about the future of Somalia’s diplomacy and regional relations. In December 2024, the United Nations approved a new peacekeeping mission in Somalia called the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). This mission will send about 12,626 personnel to fight the terrorist group al-Shabaab and improve Somalia’s security and stability. Somalia has decided not to include Ethiopia in the AUSSOM mission. The main reason for this decision is that Somali officials believe Ethiopia has violated Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial rights. This decision comes after several events that have caused tension between the two countries. Earlier in the year, Ethiopia signed an agreement with the Republic of Somaliland. The agreement allowed Ethiopia to set up a naval base in Somaliland, possibly in exchange for recognizing Somaliland’s independence. Somalia saw this as a threat to its territorial unity and sovereignty.
Ethiopia released a photo showing Somalia’s President receiving a salute from troops similar to Ethiopia’s naval forces, sparking a strong debate on social media. This also sent a message to the recent alliance formed between Somalia, Egypt, and Eritrea, which included a three-party security agreement. Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s visit can be seen as a significant shift, contradicting his earlier statements about Somali territory being violated. Dr. Abiy Ahmed’s action in releasing the photo might be seen as an attempt to undermine Hassan Sheikh’s credibility.
Conclusion
The diplomatic relationship between Somalia and Ethiopia has been marked by historical tensions, particularly over the Ogaden region, where many ethnic Somalis reside in Ethiopia. Somalia’s early foreign policy focused on uniting Somali territories, leading to the 1977 Ogaden War, which Somalia lost. After Somalia’s government collapsed in 1991, Ethiopia intervened in Somali internal affairs, including military operations against militant groups. However, the 2024 signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Ethiopia and Somaliland to establish a naval base on Somaliland’s coastline has sparked renewed tensions. Somalia sees this as a threat to its sovereignty, further complicating relations. Despite efforts in the 2010s to improve diplomatic ties, the current crisis, along with political maneuvering, highlights the challenges in Somali diplomacy, as President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s shifting stance and Somaliland’s push for independence create significant regional discord. The future of Somalia’s relations with Ethiopia and Somaliland remains uncertain, as both countries navigate complex political and territorial issues.
Khadir Abdilahi Mohamed (Khadir Dhore)
“Political Commentator, Researcher and Lecture”
MA Development Policy in ECSU- Post Graduate Diploma in Planning and Policy in GIMPA- BA Development Management in CSI. Head of Training and Development at Somaliland Civil Service Commission.
Email: Khadirdhore34@gmail.com
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the Horndiplomat editorial policy.
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